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Abstract: 
The following argument is widely assumed to be invalid: ​there is a pain in my finger; my finger is                                     
in my mouth; therefore, there is a pain in my mouth​. The apparent invalidity of this argument has                                   
recently been used to motivate the conclusion that pains are not spatial entities. We argue                             
that this is a mistake. We do so by drawing attention to the metaphysics of pains and holes                                   
and provide a framework for their location which both vindicates the argument’s validity                         
and explains why it appears invalid. To this end, we show that previously proposed                           
explanations for the apparent invalidity of the argument fail. Moreover, we show that our                           
account accommodates and explains seemingly opposing linguistic data. We conclude that                     
the ‘pain-in-mouth argument’ does not undermine the view that pains are spatial entities.  
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I am in agony and Brussels 
I am in agony and my room 
I am in my head and agony 
I am in a whole  
Lot of trouble supposedly 




The following argument is widely assumed to be invalid: 
 
(1) 
a.​ There is a pain in my finger. 
b.​ My finger is in my mouth. 
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c.​ Therefore, there is a pain in my mouth. 
 
The so-called ‘pain-in-mouth argument’ has had a serious impact on recent discussions of pain,                           
and continues to be the subject of considerable controversy. Ongoing debates centre on three                           
distinct issues: First, the issue of whether or not the argument really is invalid. While most                               
philosophers accept the invalidity of (1) (Tye 1995a, 1995b, 1996, 2002, 2005, 2017; Noordhof                           
2001, 2002, 2005; Carruthers 2000; cf. Block 1983), some have suggested that it might in fact be                                 
valid, despite appearances to the contrary (Reuter ​et al​. 2019). Second, the issue of what explains                               
the argument’s apparent invalidity. Some have argued that talk of pain creates an intensional                           
context (Tye 1995, 2002), others that there is equivocation on multiple senses of ‘in’ (Noordhof                             
2001, 2002). Finally, there is the issue of what the philosophical upshots of the argument are.                               
The apparent invalidity of the argument has been used to argue against the view that pains are                                 
spatially located entities (Tye 2017; Liu & Klein 2020), whereas its validity has been regarded as                               
evidence for a ‘bodily conception’ of pain (Reuter ​et al​. 2019). 
 
The aim of this paper is to vindicate the validity of the pain-in-mouth argument by providing a                                 
metaphysical framework for the location of both pains and holes: these are entities enjoying                           
spatial location in virtue of their dependence on a ‘host’. We argue that such a framework is best                                   
equipped to provide principled responses to all three areas of controversy. To this end, we first                               
consider two proposed explanations for the invalidity of the argument: one appealing to                         
intensional contexts, the other to multiple senses of ‘in’ (§2). We show that both explanations                             
fail. We then discuss a recent proposal which holds that the argument only ​appears invalid due to                                 
a conversational implicature (§3). Building on this, we propose a valid reading of the argument                             
by drawing attention to the metaphysics of pains and holes (§4), and respond to recent                             
objections motivated by linguistic data (§5). 
 
We conclude that (i) the pain-in-mouth argument is a valid argument; that (ii) its apparent                             
invalidity is explained by a conversational implicature based on the metaphysics of pains and                           
holes; and that (iii) the argument cannot be used against the view that pain is spatially located,                                 
nor in favour of the view that pain is an extramental bodily feature.  
 
2 
What is the significance of the pain-in-mouth argument? This question has rarely been addressed                           
in any detail, and is hence worth considering at the outset. The answer is that the argument, and                                   
its alleged failure, may reveal something about our concept of pain. In particular, it may reveal                               
something about how we think of pain’s spatial character. If, for instance, the argument fails and                               
pains do not follow patterns of ordinary topological inferences, then this might speak against the                             
view that we think of pains as analogous to ordinary spatial entities. Some have thought that                               
such considerations are important when trying to adjudicate between competing philosophical                     
accounts of pain (e.g. Liu & Klein 2020). That said, we think one may be sceptical of what kinds                                     
of conclusions the pain-in-mouth argument really warrants. However, we believe that even a                         




2. Two Explanations for the Invalidity of the Argument 
 
A consensus among many philosophers as to why the pain-in-mouth argument strikes us as                           
intuitively invalid is that it ​is invalid. Previous discussions of the pain-in-mouth argument have                           
centred on two competing explanations for its alleged invalidity: one having to do with                           




Michael Tye argues that statements of pain location have a ‘hidden intensionality’ (Tye 1995:                           
112), and that (1) is invalid in the same way as (2): 
 
(2) 
a. ​Rohini wants to be in Milan. 
b. ​Milan is in a storm. 
c. ​#Therefore, Rohini wants to be in a storm. (see ​ibid​.: 226-228) 
 
Attitude verbs like ‘wants’ and ‘believes’ create ​intensional contexts​: contexts in which                       
co-extensional statements are not inter-substitutable. That is why we cannot substitute talk of                         
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someone’s desire to be in Milan with a desire to be in the same location under a different                                   
specification. Hence, (2c) is an invalid inference. On Tye’s view, the same is true of pain.                               
Statements of pain location, such as (1a) and (1c), create intensional contexts which prevent                           
inter-substitution of locations. 
 
As Noordhof (2001) notes, however, an appeal to intensionality alone cannot explain why (1)                           
appears invalid. This is because arguments clearly free from intensional operators seem to                         
generate ‘precisely the same invalidity as the original argument’ (96): 
 
(3)  
a. ​There is a hole in my shoe. 
b.​ The shoe is in the box. 
c.​ Therefore, there is a hole in the box.  
 
The analogy between (1) and (3) is compelling. However, (3) can hardly be explained by appeal                               
to intensional contexts, which are created by ascriptions involving representational states (or                       
modal operators). This may be a possible view for the case of pain (Tye 1995, 2000), but to make                                     
this claim in the case of holes is ​ad hoc​. So if (1) and (3) are analogous arguments, as they seem to                                           
be, then an appeal to intensionality cannot be what explains their apparent invalidity.  
 
There is a further point that can be made against Tye’s argument. While (2a) and (2b) do not                                   
entail (2c), Rohini could not coherently believe and assent to (2a) and (2b) without thereby                             
committing herself to (2c). That is to say, when both premises are stated in the first person, there                                   
is conversational pressure on the speaker to accept the conclusion. Imagine someone were to                           
approach you and confidently state that they believe their cat to be at home. You point out, in                                   
response, that their home is in Houston. Now, this person must either accept that their cat is in                                   
Houston, or give up their initial belief, at pain of being incoherent. 
 
But the same does not seem true of the claims in (1). Someone who asserts that there is a pain in                                         
their finger, and who is reminded that their finger is in their mouth, does not appear to be under                                     
conversational pressure to endorse the claim that there is a pain in their mouth. So there is a                                   
feature of intensional contexts created by belief ascriptions that is absent from talk of pain. This                               
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2.2. Senses of ‘in’ 
 
Noordhof (2001, 2002) and (later) Tye (2002, 2005) take the idea that (1) and (3) are invalid for                                   
the same reasons to reveal that there is equivocation on different senses of ‘in’. According to                               
Noordhof, this equivocation is between a spatial sense of ‘in’, and a sense of ‘in’ describing the                                 
state of an object (cf. Liu 2020: fn. 11). According to Tye, the equivocation is between two                                 
spatial senses of ‘in’; one sense expressing full enclosure within a cavity, the other expressing                             
partial embedding within a cavity’s boundaries. On any such account, (1) and (3) are taken to be                                 
invalid due to equivocation. 
 
While we don’t dispute that the preposition ‘in’ may have different senses, spatial or otherwise,                             
we think that both Noordhof and Tye are a little too quick on the trigger. Importantly, there are                                   
(at least) two distinct ways in which a word can be said to have multiple senses. One way is for it                                         
to be ​homonymous​, which is for the same one sequence of symbols to have multiple lexical entries.                                 
The word ‘bank’, for instance, is homonymous since it denotes both a riverbank as well as a                                 
financial institution. Now, if the preposition ‘in’ were homonymous in the way ‘bank’ is, and if                               
the pain-in-mouth argument traded on multiple lexical entries of ‘in’, then it would indeed be                             
hard to see how the argument could be valid. That’s because in the case of homonymy, we                                 
would be equivocating between two entirely independent denotations that needn’t share anything                       
but a single ortho-phonological word form.  
 
However, we claim that the instances of ‘in’ in the pain-in-mouth argument are not distinct                             
lexical entries. To see this, note that homonyms—as a rule—do not allow for anaphoric binding: 
 
(4)  
a. ​#The bank opens at 9 and slopes into the river.  
b. ​#The school is closed over the holidays and swims in harmony. 
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Without a fantastic backstory, neither (4a) nor (4b) yield a felicitous reading. Hence, if statements                             
of pain or hole location employed a lexical entry of ‘in’ which differs from that of ordinary                                 
spatial entities, such as (say) fingers or shoes, then statements of the following form, which                             
operate with a single sense of ‘in’, should be infelicitous too:  
 
(5)  
a. ​There is a finger and a pain in my mouth. 
b.​ There is a shoe and a hole in the box. 
 
However, it doesn’t seem like they are. At the very least, no fantastic backstory is required to                                 
make sense of these sentences. Since there is only a single occurrence of ‘in’, and both (5a) and                                   
(5b) read fine, we can presume that there is just one lexical entry of ‘in’ operating in each                                   
sentence. Consequently, the preposition ‘in’ that goes with pains and holes is lexically the same                             
‘in’ as that which goes with ordinary spatial entities, such as shoes or fingers. The pain-in-mouth                               
argument, then, is not invalid due to homonymy.  
 
However, there is another way in which a word may be said to have multiple senses. That is, it                                     
may be ​polysemous​, which is for the same one word to have a single lexical entry with multiple                                   
denotations (Pustejovsky 1995). The word ‘bottle’, for instance, may denote a container (as in                           
‘Madhu smashed the bottle’), or its content (as in ‘Madhu drank a bottle of beer’). Importantly,                               
and in contrast to homonymy, distinct denotations of polysemous words ​can be related through                           
anaphoric binding (see Quilty-Dunn forthcoming): 
 
(6) ​Madhu drank her bottle of beer and smashed it on the floor.  
 
Because of this, the anaphoric binding of (5a) and (5b) cannot rule out the possibility that ‘in’ is                                   
polysemous, and that the ‘in’ of pains and holes has a different denotation from the ‘in’ of                                 
ordinary spatial entities. As such, it remains a live possibility that the pain-in-mouth argument                           
trades on multiple denotations of the word ‘in’, even if such denotations are not distinct lexical                               
entries.   1
1 Some recent work on polysemy suggests that one can test empirically whether a word is polysemous,                                 
homonymous, or neither, through tests of reading speed and priming (see e.g. Klepousniotou & Baum 2007). 
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Let’s assume that ‘in’ is polysemous, and, for the sake of argument, that the pain-in-mouth                             
argument does trade on its distinct denotations. Accordingly, the sense of ‘in’ in ‘there is a pain ​in                                   
my finger’ is distinct from the sense of ‘in’ in ‘my finger is ​in my mouth’. Does this render the                                       
argument invalid? The matter is not straightforward since not all arguments trading on polysemic                           
expressions are invalid. Consider (7): 
 
(7) 
a. ​Clay baked a cake. 
b. ​Clay baked a potato. 
c. ​Therefore, Clay baked two things. 
 
The sense in which Clay ​baked a cake is quite distinct from the sense in which he ​baked a potato                                       
(see Quilty-Dunn forthcoming; Fodor & Lepore 2002: p. 110). Nevertheless, it’s not clear that                           
we can’t infer from this that Clay baked two things. But if that’s true, then trading on distinct                                   
denotations of polysemic expressions does not guarantee the invalidity of an argument. And if it                             
doesn’t guarantee the invalidity of an argument, then polysemy is by itself insufficient to establish                             
the invalidity of the pain-in-mouth argument. As a consequence, more would have to be invoked                             
than the mere fact of polysemy to explain why we should think that the pain-in-mouth argument                               
is invalid. However, neither Noordhof nor Tye make an effort to do so. But as such, an appeal to                                     
multiple senses of ‘in’, be it qua homonymy or polysemy, does not show the invalidity of the                                 
pain-in-mouth argument. 
 
Note, too, that there is a further possibility; namely, that ‘in’ as it occurs in the pain-in-mouth                                 
argument is neither homonymous nor polysemous. Rather, the apparent difference between a                       
pain being ‘in’ something and a finger being ‘in’ something may simply consist in the difference                               
between pains and fingers. On this view, the ‘in’ of pain location can only be said to differ from                                     
that of finger location insofar as pains and fingers are interestingly different entities. As Jerry                             
Fodor puts it: 
 
People sometimes used to say that ‘exist’ must be ambiguous because look at the                           
difference between ‘chairs exist’ and ‘numbers exist’. A familiar reply goes: the                       
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difference between the existence of chairs and the existence of numbers seems, on                         
reflection, strikingly like the difference between numbers and chairs. (1998: 54) 
 
These considerations reveal that matters of ambiguity are less straightforward than Noordhof and                         
Tye give them credit for. Their supposition that ‘in’ has ‘multiple senses’ is in itself ambiguous                               
between the charge of homonymy and polysemy. The former we can rule out, the latter by itself                                 
does not enforce invalidity. Hence, for all that has been said, even if ‘in’ had multiple senses, and                                   
even if the pain-in-mouth argument (as well as the hole-in-box argument) traded on those                           
different senses, the argument need not be invalid. 
 
 
3. An Explanation for the ​Apparent ​Invalidity of the Argument 
 
In the absence of a compelling story for the invalidity of the argument, Reuter, Sienhold, and                               
Sytsma (2019) argue that the argument ​is valid, but that it contains a conversational implicature                             
that gives it the appearance of invalidity. Though we are sympathetic to their line of argument,                               
we contend that Reuter and colleagues develop their proposal in an unpromising way.  
 
They begin by noting that the same intuition of invalidity can be found in cases where ‘in’ is used                                     
in a ‘purely spatial’ sense (74): 
 
(8) 
a. ​There is tissue damage in my finger. 
b. ​My finger is in my mouth. 
c. ​Therefore, there is tissue damage in my mouth. 
 
On their view, since (8) intuitively fails in the same way (1) does, but retains a spatial ‘in’,                                   
Noordhof cannot be right to think that the ‘in’ of (1a) is non-spatial. They do, however, agree                                 
with Noordhof that the apparent failure of the argument does have to do with a state-attributing                               
factor. Reuter and colleagues’ suggestion is that (8c) conversationally implicates that ‘there is                         
something wrong with the place in which there is tissue damage’. Likewise, (1c) conversationally                           
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implicates that ‘there is something wrong with the place in which there is a pain’ (p. 74). Since                                   
neither implication can be found in the premises, (1) and (8) appear invalid arguments. 
 
How does this implicature arise? 
 
In most circumstances, it would hardly be relevant for a speaker to say that she has                               
tissue damage in her mouth if she had just put an injured finger in her mouth. And                                 
saying that there is tissue damage in her mouth would hardly be a perspicuous way to                               
convey this state of affairs. If she has injured the inside of her mouth, however, the                               
claim that there is tissue damage in her mouth will be both relevant and clear in most                                 
conversational settings. (2019: 74) 
 
Unfortunately, Reuter and colleagues do little to support either the claim that (1) is more like (8)                                 
than like (3), ​or the claim that the sense of ‘in’ used in (8a) truly is spatial. Moreover, they do little                                         
to support their claim that what is implied in pain locutions is that there is ‘something wrong                                 
with the place in which there is a pain’, other than to provide experimental evidence indicating                               
similar misreadings in arguments that exchange ‘pain’ for ‘tissue damage’ or ‘inflammation’.  
 
Of course, tissue damage is something that may be spatially located in a finger, and something                               
that, when used in language, may plausibly implicate that there is something ‘wrong’ with the                             
place it is at. However, if that is true of ‘tissue damage’, then one would expect the same to be                                       




a. ​There is tissue damage in my mouth. 
b. ​There is damaged tissue in my mouth. 
 
But compare (8) with (10): 
 
(10) 
a. ​There is damaged tissue in my finger. 
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b. ​My finger is in my mouth. 
c. ​Therefore, there is damaged tissue in my mouth. 
 
In comparison to (8), (10) strikes us as unproblematically valid. But this suggests that there is                               2
some difference between ascriptions of tissue damage in (8) and ascriptions of damaged tissue in                             
(10), even though both ‘tissue damage’ and ‘damaged tissue’ plausibly imply something being                         
‘wrong’ with the place they occur at. ‘Tissue damage’ and ‘damaged tissue’ embed in arguments                             
differently. But if their supposed implicatures arise for no other reason than that these sentences                             
would be clumsy ways to communicate some alternative state of affairs, then we should expect                             
(8) and (10) to behave similarly. However, they do not. This sheds doubt on the proposal in                                 
question. 
 
In addition, Reuter and colleagues’ suggested explanation for the apparent invalidity of the                         
pain-in-mouth argument doesn’t offer an explanation for the apparent invalidity of other                       
seemingly equivalent arguments. We noted earlier that analogous arguments to the                     
pain-in-mouth argument can be constructed for holes. But it doesn’t stop there: locutions                         
featuring creases, stains, and many other entities can be put into a similar form. For instance, 
 
(11) 
a. ​There is a crease in my shirt. 
b. ​My shirt is in the washing machine. 
c. ​Therefore, there is a crease in the washing machine. (see Hyman 2003) 
 
If all of these arguments are analogous, and if implicature is responsible for their apparent                             
invalidity, then we are left wondering what might be implied in sentences featuring holes, creases,                             
and so forth. Reuter and colleagues do not offer any answers. We can do better. 
 
 
4. Pains and Holes 
 
2 ​An anonymous reviewer helpfully points out that they ran an (unspecified) experiment which supports this finding. 
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We have argued that neither an appeal to (hidden) intensionality, nor an appeal to multiple                             
senses of ‘in’ can adequately justify the alleged invalidity of (1) or (3). At this point, we want to                                     
claim that ​neither ​the pain-in-mouth nor the hole-in-box argument are invalid arguments. Instead,                         
we suggest, similarly to Reuter and colleagues, that these arguments only have the ​appearance ​of                             
invalidity, due to a shared conversational implicature. Unlike Reuter and colleagues, however, we                         
propose that this implicature has its roots in the metaphysics of pains and holes, as well as that                                   
of other ‘hosted’ entities.  
 
As Ned Block notes, the arguments in (1) and (3) are valid as long as we fix on a single spatial                                         
sense of ‘in’ throughout (Block 1983). The arguments are only invalid if we insist on a particular                                 
reading of (1c) or (3c). A reading of (1c) that produces the valid reading of the argument in (1) is                                       
that ‘there is a region within my mouth at which there is a pain’: 
 
(1)​† 
a. ​There is a pain in my finger. 
b. ​My finger is in my mouth. 
c. ​Therefore, there is a region within my mouth at which there is a pain. 
 
A reading of (1c) that produces the invalid reading of (1) is that ‘my mouth hurts’.  
 
(1)​‡ 
a.​ There is a pain in my finger. 
b. ​My finger is in my mouth. 
c. ​#Therefore, my mouth hurts.  
 
A reading of (3c) that produces the valid reading of (3) is that ‘there is a region within the box at                                         
which there is a hole’: 
 
(3)​† 
a.​ There is a hole in my shoe. 
b. ​The shoe is in the box. 
c. ​Therefore, there is a region within the box at which there is a hole. 
11 
 
 A reading of (3c) that produces the invalid reading of (3) is that ‘the box is perforated’: 
 
(3)​‡ 
a.​ There is a hole in my shoe. 
b. ​The shoe is in the box. 
c. ​#Therefore, the box is perforated. 
 
As such, to insist that (1) or (3) are invalid arguments is to insist on a particular reading of their                                       
conclusions. However, the fact that an invalid inference is available doesn’t show that the                           
argument is itself invalid. If it shows anything at all, it is that we are tempted by a reading of (1c)                                         
and (3c) which wouldn’t make for a valid inference in either argument. ​The reason we are                                 
tempted by an invalid reading of (1c) and (3c), we suggest, is ultimately explained by the                               
metaphysics of pains and holes, and the way in which entities of this kind find themselves in                                 
space. To see this, consider the following way of thinking about spatial location: 
 
Broadly speaking, what it is for something to be spatially located is for it to be in a place, where                                       
that place is a particular region of space. For instance, a coin may count as located in virtue of its                                       
being in my pocket, or a book may count as located in virtue of its being on my shelf. Both                                       
objects are located because they are in certain places.  
 
For ‘ordinary objects’, such as chairs, tables, vases, and so forth, it seems that there are two ways                                   
in which we think of such objects as being in a place: ​mediately and ​immediately (see Martin 2017).                                   
Mediate location is location in one place in virtue of being in another. For instance, I may count as                                     
being mediately located in Texas, because I am in Austin, which is a subregion of Texas entirely                                 
enclosed by it. ​Immediate location​, on the other hand, is location in one place simply in virtue of                                   
occupying a specific region of space. Hence I may count as being immediately located at the                               
region of space that I currently occupy—a region between my chair and my desk. Concerning                             
the location of ordinary objects, mediate ​and immediate ​location seem to come together: an                           




Not everything that has location is located in this way. In fact, different spatial entities bear                               
different relationships to space (Casati & Varzi 1999: 138). Consider holes: holes are distinct                           
from ordinary objects in that they are immaterial (​ibid​.; cf. Lewis & Lewis 1970). They are empty                                 
spaces within objects. Nevertheless, holes can be located in all sorts of places, such as cheese,                               
trousers, doughnuts, ears, or windows. Importantly, and as this list suggests, they are always                           
located within something else: A hole isn’t a hole unless it is a hole in something. Or, in other                                     
words, a hole always has a ‘host’ (Casati & Varzi 1994: 2). 
 
As such, it would seem that holes have something akin to mediate location, but no immediate                               
location: a hole counts as located in my sock in virtue of it being entirely enclosed by my sock,                                     
but there is no region in space that the hole occupies independently. The region of empty space                                 
in my sock without the sock is not a hole. Moreover, the location of a hole comes without any                                     
implication of exclusion. A hole in my sock doesn’t exclude my toe from filling (part of) it. In                                   
contrast to ordinary objects, then, holes seem to enjoy ​parasitic location. That is to say, holes get                                 
to have a spatial location in virtue of being ‘attached’ to something which is itself located in a                                   
place in the ordinary way. Similar accounts may be given for other non-ordinary objects, such as                               
shadows, stains, or creases.  
 
The location of pain appears remarkably similar to that of holes and other entities of this kind.                                 
Like holes, pains, too, appear to be ‘hosted’ by other entities—in this case parts of one’s body.                                 
Indeed, some have thought it ‘all but impossible to comprehend a claim concerning sensation                           
position that ​detaches it from actual or seeming limb​, e.g. “A pain to the right of my shoulder and not                                       
even in a seeming body part”’ (O’Shaughnessy 2008: 198; original emphasis). Accordingly, even                         
an amputee experiences their phantom pain as if occurring in a part of their body. Moreover, like                                 
holes, pains do not exclude other objects (except perhaps other pains) from the spatial regions at                               
which they are felt. ​These similarities suggest that pain location may be suitably modelled after                            
other non-ordinary objects. Much like holes, creases and so forth, pains appear to be parasitically                             
located. 
 
These considerations are important for the issue at hand. Unlike coins, fingers, mouths, or                           
boxes, pains and holes do not find themselves in space independently of a host. All holes are                                 
holes in something, and all pains are pains felt (as) in body parts. As such, pains and holes are                                     
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‘spatially dependent’ entities, which do not exist in space without a host. Consequently,                         
statements referring to the location of such entities may be thought to ​ordinarily require mention                             
of their hosts: To speak of the location of a pain or a hole without specifying what they are a                                       
pain or a hole ​in​ is to omit a vital piece of information. 
 
We argue that this is precisely what occurs in the conclusions of (1) and (3). In (1c), there is a                                       
pain in my mouth ​insofar as my mouth contains a finger which hosts a pain. Hence, ‘in my                                   
mouth’ does not specify the host of the pain, but the container of the host. However, since                                 
statements of pain location ordinarily require the specification of a host, and the actual host isn’t                               
mentioned, the sentence offers a natural misreading as implicating that my mouth hosts the pain.                             
The same, we suggest, is true in the case of holes. In (3c), there is a hole in the box ​insofar as the                                             
box contains a shoe which hosts a hole. But again, since statements of hole location ordinarily                               
require the specification of a host, and the actual host isn’t mentioned, the sentence is misread as                                 
implicating that the box hosts the hole. Hence, what explains the misreading of (1) and (3) is the                                   
fact that ‘in my mouth’ and ‘in the box’ conversationally implicate a specification of the host of                                 
the pain or the hole, and not the container of the host. 
 
Our positive proposal, then, is that pains and holes are spatially dependent entities, which affects                             
the way they find themselves in space and, consequently, the way we specify their location in                               
language. This account generalises across spatially dependent entities beyond pains and holes.                       
Hence, structurally analogous arguments to (1) and (3), such as (8) and (11), among others, can                               
be dealt with in just the same way. As opposed to Reuter and colleagues’ picture of implicature,                                 





We have argued that the pain-in-mouth argument is a valid argument, and we have given an                               
implicature account to explain its appearance of invalidity, based on the metaphysics of pains                           
and holes. We now turn to consider two possible objections to our account. 
 
5.1. Implicature and Entailment 
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Michelle Liu (2020) has recently argued in favour of an ​entailment account of the intuitive                             
invalidity of the pain-in-mouth argument. On her account, the semantic content of ‘there is a                             
pain in my mouth’ is not logically independent from that expressed by ‘my mouth hurts’. Rather,                               
Liu claims, ‘there is a pain in my mouth’ semantically ​entails​ ‘my mouth hurts’. 
To this end, Liu first argues that the relationship between these locutions cannot be that                             
of mere implicature. As she suggests, Reuter and colleagues’ suggested implicature (discussed                       
above) fails Grice’s ‘cancellability’ test (see Grice 1975). The thought behind this test is that if an                                 
utterance ​p conversationally implicates, rather than strictly entails, ​q​, then asserting ‘​p but not ​q​’                             
should be ‘admissible or at least not outright contradictory’ (Liu 2020: 465). Hence, if ‘there is a                                 
pain in my mouth’ merely conversationally implicated ‘there is something wrong with my                         
mouth’, as Reuter and colleagues propose, then the following sentence should pass the test (that                             
is to say, the implicature associated with the first conjunct should be cancellable by the second                               
conjunct): 
 
(12) ​There is a pain in my mouth, but there is nothing wrong with my mouth. 
 
However, Liu provides empirical evidence which she takes to support the conclusion that test                           
subjects do not treat (12) as admissible (​ibid​.: 466). This is taken to speak against an implicature                                 
account. 
Instead, Liu suggests that (in English) the locative locution ‘there is a pain in my mouth’                               
semantically ​entails the predicative locution ‘my mouth hurts’. She notes that if ​p ​entails ​q​, then a                                 
speaker cannot assert ​p ​and subsequently deny ​q ​without thereby contradicting herself. Hence, if                           
‘there is a pain in my mouth’ semantically entailed ‘my mouth hurts’, as Liu proposes, then the                                 
following sentences should read as contradictions: 
 
(13) 
a. ​There is a pain in my mouth, but my mouth doesn’t hurt. 
b. ​My mouth hurts, but there is no pain in my mouth. 
 
Liu provides empirical evidence which she takes to support the conclusion that test subjects treat                             
(13a) and (13b) as ​semantic contradictions (​ibid​.: 469). Thus, she concludes that the (apparent)                           
invalidity of the pain-in-mouth argument is not due to a conversational implicature, but due to                             
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semantic entailment: The argument’s conclusion, ‘there is a pain in my mouth’, semantically                         
entails ‘my mouth hurts’, which cannot be inferred from the premisses (​ibid​.: 472). Hence the                             
argument’s intuitive invalidity. 
A potential problem posed for our account is the following: if ‘there is a pain in my                                 
mouth’ ​entails ‘my mouth hurts’, then an invalid reading of the pain-in-mouth argument is, in                             
fact, unavoidable. Hence, our account would fail to vindicate the argument’s validity. 
In reply, it is important to note at the outset that whether or not cancellability is a                                 
necessary condition for implicature is a controversial issue, and that numerous philosophers and                         
linguists have questioned the reliability of the cancellability test (e.g. Åkerman 2015;                       
Burton-Roberts 2010; Capone 2009; Huitink and Spenader 2004; Lauer 2014; Rysiew 2007:                       
646f.; Sadock 1978; Weiner 2006. For a helpful overview of the debate see Zakkou 2018). As                               
such, how decisive a result we can hope the cancellability test to provide is not at all obvious.   
Similarly, it is not obvious how decisive we should consider Liu’s data in favour of                             
semantic entailment. Note, first, that test subjects are rating task sentences entirely out of                           
context. But while sentences such as (13a&b) may strike a subject as contradictory in isolation,                             
the same may not be true when provided with the suitable context. For instance, embedding                             
(13a) in (1) would yield, we suspect, an improved reading of the sentence: 
 
(1*) 
a.​ There is a pain in my finger 
b.​ My finger is in my mouth 




c*. ​So, there is a pain in my mouth, but I don’t mean to imply that my mouth                                   
hurts.  3
 
3 The proposed fidelity of (1*c) and (1*c*) may be taken to speak against the occasional suggestion that ‘there is a 
pain in my mouth’ and ‘my mouth hurts’ are perfect paraphrases of one another (see Bain 2007; Hyman 2003; Liu & 
Klein 2020). 
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Moreover, and relatedly, it isn’t really surprising that subjects would rate sentences such as                           
(13a&b) as contradictory, given that the circumstances under which the meanings of ‘there is a                             
pain in my mouth’ and ‘my mouth hurts’ come apart are quite extraordinary. As we have noted                                 
above, to speak of the location of a pain without specifying its host is to omit a vital piece of                                       
information. Hence, it is not an effective way to communicate the location of pains (or holes).                               
While the meanings of ‘there is a pain in my mouth’ and ‘my mouth hurts’ can come apart, we                                     
suggest that there is rarely a circumstance in which they do. As such, a contradictory reading of                                 




Michelle Liu & Colin Klein (2020) have recently pointed out that Mandarin Chinese lacks a                             
locative ascription of pain. Accordingly, the parallel construction of ‘there is a pain in my finger’                               
cannot be produced in Mandarin. In its stead, pain locutions are commonly formulated via                           
subject-predicate ascriptions, like ‘my finger hurts’. Liu & Klein take their findings to support the                             
suggestion that locative ascriptions of pain are philosophically misleading, threatening to                     
undermine various philosophical theories, possibly including our own, which consider pains to                       
be spatially located entities. 
However, this is a non-sequitur. For if we consider some linguistic data about ‘hurts’                           
locutions, it is clear that they, too, carry a locative connotation: 
 
(14) 
a. ​My foot hurts in two ​places​. 
b. ​It hurts ​here​ and ​there​. 
c. ​Where ​does it hurt? 
 
Hence, even if all we had to go on were subject-predicate ascriptions of pain, we might still                                 
support a view on which pains are spatially located entities. In fact, some philosophers have                             
done exactly that. John Hyman (2003) and Adam Bradley (​forthcoming​), who have drawn on                           
predicative pain attributions, have argued explicitly that pains are ​modes or ​modifications                       
(respectively) of body parts, and as such ​spatially located entities​. Hence, it is unclear why we should                                 
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think that Liu & Klein’s linguistic data speaks against the view that pains are spatially located                               
entities.  
In fact, it should perhaps not strike us as unusual that a linguistic community would only                               
make use of the subject-predicate ‘hurts’ locution. That’s because ‘hurts’ locutions always come                         
with a specification of the pain’s host: my finger hurts, my shins hurt, my body hurts, etc. Given                                   
that, as we have suggested above, the specification of a pain’s host is crucial when speaking of a                                   
pain’s location, ‘hurts’ locutions are well equipped to communicate a feature of pain we care                             





We have argued that if there is a pain in my finger, and my finger is in my mouth, then there is a                                             
pain in my mouth. Moreover, if there is a hole in my shoe, and my shoe is in a box, then there is                                             
a hole in the box. Both are valid arguments, even though they encourage a natural misreading,                               
due to a conversational implicature, which has its roots in the metaphysics of pains and holes as                                 
hosted entities.  
 
Our proposal has implications for current debates over the nature of pain. One upshot is that,                               
pace ​Tye (2017), the alleged invalidity of (1) cannot be used as a successful argument against the                                 
view that pains are spatially located within body parts. Tye argues that, if they were, then (1)                                 
would be a valid argument which, according to him, it ‘patently’ is not (​ibid​.: 479). As we have                                   
argued, however, (1) ​is a valid argument. Hence, either the validity of topological inferences, such                             
as (1), is a guide to genuine spatial location, in which case Tye’s argument is self-defeating, or it is                                     
not, in which case Tye’s argument is irrelevant.  
 
At the same time, we reject the notion that the validity of the argument can be used as an                                     
argument in favour of the idea that ‘pain is a state of the body, not of the mind’ (Reuter et al.                                         
2019). If our proposal is correct, then pains get to be located in the same way as do holes and                                       
other ‘extraordinary entities’. For all that has been said, such a proposal is neutral on the                               
question of whether pain is extramental or not. In fact, as Bradley (​forthcoming​) has shown, there                               
are compelling accounts of pain, compatible with our proposal, which regard pains as                         
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mind-dependent modifications of body parts. As such, the validity of the pain-in-mouth                       
argument is not itself an argument against pains being, in some sense, mental. If anything, our                               
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